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Abstract
The fight against cartels is a priority for antitrust authorities on both sides of
the Atlantic. What differs between the EU and the US is not the basic toolkit for
achieving deterrence, but to whom it is targeted. In the EU, pecuniary sanctions
against the firm are the only instruments available to the Commission, while in
the US criminal sanctions are also widely employed. The aim of this paper is to
compare two different types of fines levied on managerial firms when they col-
lude. We consider a profit based fine as opposed to a delegation based fine, with
the latter targeting the manager in a more direct way. Under the assumption of
revenue equivalence, we find that the delegation based fine, although distortive,
is more effective in deterring cartels than the profit based one. When evalu-
ating social welfare, a trade-off between deterrence and output distortion can
arise. However, if the antitrust authority focuses on consumer surplus, then the
delegation based fine is to be preferred.
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1 Introduction
The past decade has witnessed an increase in price-fixing, market-sharing and bid-
rigging cartel behaviour across the two sides of the Atlantic. As a consequence, the
fight against cartels evolved from transnational to ‘transatlantic’, requiring unprece-
dented efforts and collaboration between US and EU antitrust authorities.1 The most
evident example is probably the gradual convergence of their corporate leniency pro-
grams, with the EU revisiting its legislation in 2002 on the basis of the US experience.
Although some differences still remain, scholars and policy makers agree that the so-
called "leniency revolution" (Spagnolo, 2008) brought forth a very effective tool for
uncovering existing cartels on both sides of the Atlantic.
A similar convergence process did not occur in the sanctionatory procedure. The
respective legal and enforcement regimes remain quite different in the US in compar-
ison to the EU. Cartels are commonly treated as criminal offences in the US, where
anticompetitive activities are sanctioned with fines of up to USD 1 million and/or
with a sentence of up to ten years of imprisonment.2 The situation is however different
in the EU, where the violation of Art. 101 of the TFEU is generally not interpreted
as a criminal offence. The imposition of pecuniary sanctions against cartel members
is therefore the only instrument at the disposal of the Commission to use.3
In light of this, would it be in the best interest of the EU to also adopt criminal
sanctions in order to crack down on cartel members? First, one should consider
whether or not such criminalisation is feasible at the EU level. Recent interpretations
under the current Treaty of Lisbon have stirred controversy, and the general opinion
is that undertaking such a reform would require a long and costly process.4 Second,
1The European Commission, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission coop-
erate together primarily on the basis of the 1991 Cooperation Agreement and of the 1998 "Positive
Comity Agreement". The latter is also concerned with the exchange of information in cartel activities.
2The current level of sanctions are defined by the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and
Reform Act of 2004. In the ten year period 2003-2012, the US Courts sentenced 255 people to a total
of 176,926 days of imprisonment. Statistics available on the US Department of Justice’s website,
<www.justice.gov/atr/public/workload-statistics.html>, accessed on 16 June 2013.
3The position held by the EU regarding the definition of criminal offences and sanctions is not
completely clear. At the moment, national authorities in ten Member States can impose criminal
sanctions, including imprisonment, against individuals involved in cartels (Massey, 2004, e.g., explains
the Irish case). Their use is, however, very limited.
4Reindl (2006), for example, argues that the Commission would have to increase its standard of
proof in order to prove culpability. This could limit the number of cases that can be investigated.
2
many commentators reckon that such criminalisation, even if possible, would not be
desirable in the socio-economic and cultural context of the EU.5
On these grounds, the purpose of this paper is not to provide a holistic com-
parison between two sanctionatory approaches influenced by two inherently different
worldviews. Rather, we attempt to model, in a stylised way, the "punishing-the-firm
versus punishing-the-person" controversy and better understand its economic effects.
To this aim, we consider a model of repeated Cournot competition with managerial
firms and study how the sustainability of collusion can be affected by different types
of sanctions.
In particular, a representative antitrust authority has to decide between two types
of penalties aimed at deterring cartel formation. The first type of penalty targets a
firm’s profit and it is the most commonly used instrument in the literature. The
second type targets instead the manager’s terms of contract and, in particular, its
delegated powers. Although this stylised modelling device does not fully capture the
idea of criminal sanction such as imprisonment, it does however constitute a first
attempt to represent a measure intended to criminalise the collusive behaviour of
managers. This represents the main novelty of the paper.
First, we demonstrate that both types of fines reduce the interval region where
collusion can be sustained, although their effectiveness is dampened by delegation
intensity. We then evaluate their relative performance. The main result is that,
under a revenue equivalence assumption, a delegation based fine proves more effective
in deterring collusion than a profit based fine.
We also consider welfare implications. The delegation based fine has a distor-
tionary effect on the output level and may consequently have a negative effect on
total surplus. This reveals the existence of a potential conflict between ex ante cartel
deterrence and ex post output provision. In order to navigate such a trade-off, we
compare the expected welfare generated by the two fines. The solution is straightfor-
ward if we limit our attention to consumer surplus, as we show that the delegation
based fine is always preferred by consumers as well. However, when we consider total
expected welfare, then the trade-off may reappear, as the choice between the two in-
struments depends on the combined effect of the delegation intensity and the amount
of the fine.
5Khan (2012) provides a very interesting and thorough discussion on this issue. See also Buccirossi
and Spagnolo (2007), who evaluate benefits and costs of imprisonment in terms of cartel deterrence.
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Hence, under the basic assumptions and limitations of the model, our paper indi-
cates that an antitrust authority mainly concerned with consumer protection should
punish managers more directly. On the contrary, if the target is the interest of soci-
ety at large, then ex ante and ex post efficiency can be restored only under certain
specific conditions, and a delegation based fine is not always the best solution.
Related Literature
Since the pioneering work of Becker (1968), economists have developed an ex-
tensive literature related to "optimal sanctions".6 Sanctions should not only seek to
punish detected cartels (ex-post efficiency) but also to discourage firms to engage in
such illegal practices (ex-ante efficiency). We are mainly concerned with the deter-
rence effect of a sanction. Souam (2001) contributes to this line of research in that
he considers the effect of revenue based fines as opposed to damage based fines. In
his paper, however, what matters is how the fine is computed, not who should pay it.
A number of works have addressed the issue of imprisonment as a punishment for
cartels and price fixers, the first and best known probably being Werden and Simon
(1987). Gallo et al. (1994) present empirical evidence on the criminal punishment
enforced in the USA and they compare it with the theoretical optimum. In a related
paper, Craycraft et al. (1997) evaluate the fine levied in relation to the firm’s ability
to repay and take into consideration the value of the time spent in prison. Buccirossi
and Spagnolo (2007) present simulation evidence to question the role of imprisonment
in presence of leniency programs and whistleblowing. As underlined, our paper does
not directly address imprisonment as a punishment for managers; however, we directly
address the issue of punishing mainly the firm or the managers and to do so, we model
a managerial firm.7
Cartels have received great deal of attention in the literature in recent years,
mainly due to two factors. On the one hand, the activity of cartels is very common
despite the efforts of antitrust authorities; on the other hand, the success of deterrence
has been increased in the last decade mainly due to leniency programs. The seminal
6See, for example, Besanko and Spulber (1989), and more recent contributions as Buccirossi and
Spagnolo (2007) and Allain et al. (2011), inter alii.
7 In general, the use of criminal sanctions faced several opponents particularly in Europe where car-
tel practices do not produce strong moral disapproval. Wils (2002 and 2005) analyses the individual
sanctions and imprisonment with particular reference to the EU situation.
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paper by Motta and Polo (2003) has been followed by contributions that extend and
discuss the use of leniency programs (Spagnolo, 2004; Aubert et al., 2006; Chen and
Rey, 2012). Aubert et al. (2006) focus on the different impact of reduced fines and
positive rewards and find that rewarding individuals is more effective in deterring
collusion. Although their paper is related to ours, the objective is very different: we
do not focus on leniency and whistleblowing but on deterrence through fines, targeted
either to the firms or to the managers.
The majority of the literature on cartels and collusion treats the firm as a profit-
maximising decision maker, thereby deriving key insights on cartel stability and be-
haviour from a profit-maximising perspective. However, cartels often involve firms
having separated ownership and control in such a way that the incentives of the key
decision maker (CEO, manager) may not be fully aligned with those of the profit-
maximising shareholders. A manager’s objective depends on the structure of the
incentives that the owner designs in order to motivate him. Owners often index man-
agerial compensation to profit, sales and many other variables. The split between
ownership and control can lead to non-profit-maximising behaviour particularly if
managers are interested in maximising their own utility. For example, managers’
reputation often relates to the size of the company and their decisions may be driven
by "empire building" motivations rather than maximising the value of the firm for
its shareholders (Baumol, 1958). The corporate governance factors can have a key
impact on the operation of cartels.8
Our approach follows Vickers (1985) and Fershtman and Judd (1987): the owners
of the firms can delegate some decisional power to their managers that have the
objective of maximising a combination of profit and output, assumed to be a proxy
of the size of the firm. Delegation affects the best responses of firms and impacts the
strategic outcome of the game. This allows us to tackle the main research question in
a relatively simple way. On top of that, the assumption of managerial firms reflects
the observation that this is the nature of the majority of firms that raise the attention
of antitrust authorities.9
8See Spagnolo (2005) or Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2007) for a research agenda on corporate gov-
ernance factors and collusion.
9Recent cases of cartels operating in relatively similar sectors in the EU (TV and computer monitor
tubes) and in the US (LCD producers) clearly witness this. The decision of the EC involved fines of
about C= 1.4 billion on seven of the participating firms; the DOJ decision, on the other hand, fined for
about $ 1.39 billion eight firms and inflicted a jail sentence to two senior executives of the Taiwanese
company AU Optronics. Besides reflecting different approaches to cartel punishment, these cases
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Lambertini and Trombetta (2002) consider optimal delegation when managers
can collude on the product market after owners have set their incentives schemes,
either collusively or not. They show that if owners collude when managers behave
non-cooperatively, then collusion becomes more difficult to sustain. However, if both
managers and owners can collude, the outcome depends on the level of patience of both
agents and owners can "exploit" managers’ patience to improve on their outcomes.
Our paper assumes that delegation to managers takes place and addresses the issue
of the effect of different types of fines to deter collusion.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the basic
model and the features of the two types of fines and provides some results. Section 3
focuses on the welfare effects of different approaches to cartel deterrence. Section 4
discusses the results and concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Model and Analysis
We consider a duopoly model in which firms compete à la Cournot in the final product
market. The inverse demand is linear, and given by p = a−Q, where Q = q1+q2. The
marginal cost is constant and equal to c for both firms. An important feature of our
model is that firms are run by managers, who maximise a combination of firm’s profit
(πi) and sales (qi). This is captured by the following objective function (Vickers,
1985; Lambertini and Trombetta, 2002):
mi = πi + θiqi , i = 1, 2, (1)
where θi is the relevance of sales and represents a measure of delegation.
10 We assume
that the delegation parameter is given and, as firms are symmetric, then incentives
schemes are such that θ1 = θ2 = θ.
For simplicity of notation and without loss of generality, we set A = a− c. The
managers’ objective function can be rewritten as follows:
mi = (A−Q+ θ)qi, i = 1, 2, (2)
and A is high enough to guarantee that all quantities and profits are non-negative.
show how the corporate structure of the vast majority of the firms involved managers who have been
delegated decisions by its owners or shareholders.
10When they maximise mi, managers also maximise their compensation as their remuneration is
proportional to mi.
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The basic stage game is repeated infinitely many times. In each stage, managers
decide whether to play non-cooperatively, or to produce the collusive output. As a
result, the payoffs for each manager are denoted respectively as mN
i
, mC
i
, and mD
i
,
where N indicates the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, C the collusive equilibrium, and
D the deviation from collusion, when the rival sticks to its cartel output level. To
simplify notation, by using symmetry, we remove subscript i. In absence of fines, it is
immediate to verify that mN = (A+θ)2/9, mC = (A+θ)2/8 andmD = 9(A+θ)2/64.
Collusion is sustained through a grim trigger strategy (Friedman, 1971): if one
firm deviates from the collusive agreement, it is punished by reverting to Cournot
competition forever. Let αi ∈ [0, 1] define manager i’s individual discount factor.
We assume that players’ intertemporal preferences are pairwise symmetric, hence
α1 = α2 = α.
Standard derivations show that managers form a sustainable cartel when their
discount factor is sufficiently high, i.e. α ≥ m
D −mC
mD −mN . In the present setting, this
implies:
α ≥ 9
17
≡ α∗ (3)
which is the same threshold level than in the game without delegation.11 This repre-
sents our benchmark case.
For future reference, the collusive per-firm outcome is qC = (A + θ)/4, and the
Cournot-Nash one is qN = (A + θ)/3. Moreover, firms’ symmetric net profits are
respectively given by πC = [(A− θ) (A+ θ)] /8 and πN = [(A− 2θ) (A+ θ)] /9. We
assume that A ≥ 2θ to ensure the non-negativity of such profits.
3 The fight against cartels: two types of fines
In our model, the antitrust authority can use two types of fines to deter cartel forma-
tion. The first type targets the profits of the firm, while the second directly affects
the manager’s delegation contract. We suppose that a cartel agreement requires some
communication between managers, therefore generating tangible evidence. However,
consistently with the literature (Rey, 2003; Motta and Polo, 2003; Aubert et al., 2006;
Avramovich, 2010), we assume that the evidence disappears at the end of each period
and therefore firms are not sanctioned in case of deviation.
11For more details, see Lambertini and Trombetta (2002), p. 362.
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3.1 The profit based fine
The antitrust authority is supposed to detect the collusive behaviour between man-
agers with probability ρ.12 When this happens, it launches an investigation leading
to a successful prosecution of the cartel. A total fine F is imposed implying that each
firm pays F/2. Type I errors (firms which do not collude but are still prosecuted) are
assumed not to occur, whereas Type II errors (colluding firms are not fined) do.
Under these assumptions, the colluding managers jointly maximise:
M = (A−Q+ θ)Q− ρF. (4)
Taking the first-order condition (FOC) and imposing symmetry, we find that each
firm still produces qC = (A+θ)/4, as the expected fine ρF enters as a fixed cost. This
implies that the strategic response by the cheating player also remains the same, and
so does its final payoff, as we assumed that firms are not punished in case of deviation.
Then, mD = 9(A + θ)2/64. As Cournot-Nash profits do not depend on the fine, we
obtain again mN = (A+ θ)2/9.
The only difference w.r.t. the benchmark case is represented by the expected
payoff in case of collusion, which results in mC
P
= (A+ θ)2/8−ρF/2, where subscript
P indicates the change brought by the profit based fine.
As the incentive to form a cartel appears in presence of a prisoners’ dilemma (i.e.
individual collusive payoff must be higher than Cournot payoff), we assume that:
mCP ≥ mN ⇐⇒ ρF ≤ T =
(A+ θ)2
36
, (5)
with T being the the maximum level of the profit based fine.13
Under condition (5), managers can sustain the collusive agreement over time if
and only if their discount factor satisfies the following condition:
α ≥ 9
17
[
1 +
32ρF
(A+ θ)2
]
≡ αP . (6)
The above expression showcases the most important features of the profit based
fine. Obviously, the higher the expected fine, the more difficult is to collude. Inter-
estingly, for any given level of ρF , notice that αP decreases in θ, as the manager’s
12The exogeneity of the parameter ρ eliminates several potential effects of the antitrust policy. If
ρ depended on the firms’ prices (or quantities), then the cartel would adopt complex price patterns
(Harrington, 2004 and 2005; Harrington and Chen, 2006).
13This, a fortiori, also guarantees that cartel payoffs are positive.
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payoff positively depends on the delegation parameter. In other words, to achieve the
same level of deterrence (αP ) the expected fine needs to be bigger, the more powers
are delegated to the managers (θ).
Obviously, in absence of the antitrust policy (ρF = 0), αP would coincide with
the benchmark the threshold value α∗ = 9/17. In the opposite scenario, αP = 1 when
ρF = T , and the collusive agreement is not an option for managers.
3.2 The delegation based fine
If managers are delegated decisions on behalf of the owners, then the antitrust au-
thority may decide to punish them in a more direct way than by sanctioning the firm.
In other words, the authority may target the manager’s delegation parameter θ. In
our model, this implies that a fine f is levied on θ when collusion is detected, and
this occurs with probability ρ. In this case, the colluding managers jointly maximise:
M = [A−Q+ (θ − ρf)]Q, (7)
where ρf ·Q indicates the total amount of the expected delegation based fine.14
Taking FOC and using symmetry, the individual collusive outcome is given by
qC
D
= (A + θ − ρf)/4, where additional subscript D indicates that collusive output
levels change when a delegation based fine is levied. Hence:
Remark 1 Collusive output is affected by the delegation based fine. In particular,
one can immediately notice that qC
D
< qC .
The expected fine is now taken into account by the colluding managers in their
maximisation process, and it induces a reduction in the output level. This will have
important consequences in terms of social welfare, as we will discuss in the next
section. The corresponding payoff of a manager participating in the cartel can be
easily obtained, and it amounts to mC
D
= (A+ θ − ρf)2/8.
Interestingly, following Remark 1, the strategic response of the deviating player
now includes the expected fine. This in turn affects the deviation payoff, which
amounts to mD
D
= [3 (A+ θ) + ρf ]2 /64. As a consequence:
14The expected fine can be interpreted as a monetary reduction of the managers’ payment or
an expected utility loss deriving from the risk of being caught colluding. Although we underlined
that our model does not explicitly model criminal sanctions, in a more general interpretation the
delegation based fine can be thought as a reduced form that captures the expected loss of reputation,
benefits and other damages incurred by a guilty manager.
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Remark 2 The delegation based fine increases the incentive to deviate from the
collusive outcome, as mD
D
> mD.
A complete evaluation of the respective effectiveness of the two policy instruments
will be performed in the next section. However, Remark 2 already unveils one of the
point of strength of the delegation based fine vis-à-vis the profit based fine: deviating
from a collusive agreement becomes more profitable for the manager.
As Cournot-Nash payoffs are not affected by the fine, we can now compute the
threshold value of the discount factor which sustains collusion under the delegation
based fine. We need to ensure that the individual collusive payoff is still higher than
Cournot one. This requires:
mCD ≥mN ⇐⇒ ρf ≤ t =
(A+ θ)
(
3− 2
√
2
)
3
. (8)
We assume that the condition expressed in (8) holds throughout the paper.
Under condition (8), managers have an incentive to form a cartel if and only if:
α ≥ 9
17
[
1 +
64 ρf [5 (A+ θ)− 2ρf ]
(A+ θ + 3ρf) [17 (A+ θ) + 3ρf ]
]
≡ αD (9)
Similarly to the previous case, the higher the expected fine, the more difficult is
to collude. Moreover, for any given level of the expected fine, αD also decreases in θ.
Finally, it is immediate to verify that αD ≡ α∗ when the expected fine tends towards
zero, and that αD = 1 when ρf = t.
3.3 Profit based and delegation based fine: a comparison
The two types of fines can be compared and conditions can be found for which one
is more effective than the other in deterring collusion. The following holds:
Proposition 1 Suppose ρF ≤ T and ρf ≤ t , then a profit based fine is more
effective in deterring collusion if and only if:
ρF > T˜ =
2 ρf (A+ θ)2 (5 (A+ θ)− 2 f ρ)
(A+ θ + 3 f ρ) (17 (A+ θ) + 3ρf )
.
The opposite holds, obviously, when 0 < ρF < T˜ (ρf). Finally, the threshold
value T˜ increases with θ.
Proof See the Appendix.
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Proposition 1 conveys two main messages. The first one has an intuitive appeal:
the instrument that prevails in deterring cartels depends on the relative intensity
of the profit based fine as compared to the delegation based fine. The second one
is more interesting as it pertains to the delegation mechanism. The fact that T˜
increases with θ implies that a profit based lump-sum fine is more likely to deter
cartels if owners retain most of the decisional power. On the contrary, a distortive
fine, targeting managers more directly, is more effective when managers are delegated
a high decisional power.
Finally, notice that the comparison depends on the probability of collusion being
detected despite this is identical in the two settings: this is due to the fact that the
delegation based fine is distortive and affects the managers’ choices.
Revenue equivalence
The results in Proposition 1 are strongly affected by the possibility that the an-
titrust authority charges two different levels of sanctionatory fines, depending on
whether it opts for the profit based fine, or for the delegation based fine. However, it
would be probably more relevant for the policy maker to find out which of the two
instruments performs better for a given value of the expected revenue.15
In this context, a revenue equivalence requirement implies:
ρF = ρf · 2qCD. (10)
Following (10), condition (5) can be re-written as:
ρf <
(A+ θ)
6
(
3−
√
7
)
. (11)
By comparing (11) with (8), we find that the binding condition is t. This already
seems to indicate a superior performance of the delegation based instrument, which
is more efficient in eliminating the incentive to collude. Moreover, under (10) the
threshold discount factor αP that appears in (6) can be re-expressed as:
αreP ≡
9
17
[
1 +
16ρf (A+ θ)− 16 (ρf)2
(A+ θ)2
]
, (12)
where superscript re indicates revenue equivalence. It follows that:
15This may especially be the case if the antitrust authority has limited resources, which are mainly
generated by the fines imposed to and collected from detected cartels.
11
Proposition 2 Under (10) and assuming ρf < t, we obtain that αD > α
re
P
: a
delegation based fine is more effective than a profit based lump-sum fine in
deterring cartel formation.
Proof See the Appendix.
The main message of Proposition 2 is that the delegation based fine is more
effective in deterring collusion than the profit based fine. We already know that,
unlike the lump sum fine, the delegation based fine makes the deviation payoffs more
appealing (Remark 2), thus reducing the incentive to stick to the collusive outcome.
This occurs because the best response output of the deviating manager is increased
as the opponent expects to be fined and, hence, reduces its output.
In addition, the delegation based instrument, being distortive (Remark 1), has a
stronger impact on manager’s collusive payoff than the profit based one. Indeed, under
revenue equivalence,
(
mC
P
)re
=
[
(A+ θ)2 − 2ρf(A+ θ − ρf)
]
/8. It is immediate to
demonstrate that the collusive payoff is lower under the delegation based fine, as
mC
D
−
(
mC
P
)re
= −(ρf)2/8.
The overall outcome of these two forces is to increase the value of the minimum
discount factor that sustains collusion under the delegation based fine as compared
to the profit based one.
4 Welfare implications
The main message to be taken from the previous section is that the delegation based
fine, although distortive, is more effective in deterring cartels in comparison to a profit
based fine. Based on an ex-ante reasoning, it should therefore be implemented by the
antitrust authority. However, if it misses the mark, a delegation based instrument
may have an ex-post negative impact on consumer surplus, as the quantity produced
under collusion would shrink. The aim of this section is to explore this possible trade-
off. In doing so, we focus on the expected welfare generated by each instrument.
In our setting, cartel deterrence crucially depends on the patience of the managers.
To keep our model as simple as possible, we assume that from the antitrust authority
perspective there is a uniform distribution of the managers’ discount factor, i.e. α ∼
U [0, 1]. This may be the case if the antitrust authority has no prior information about
the managers that operate in the market: as a consequence, any discount factor is
equally likely to be realised.
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The expected welfare can then be written as:
EW = αWN + (1− α)WC , (13)
whereWN is a generic measure of welfare generated under Cournot-Nash competition,
and WC is the one associated to the cartel. This allows us to compare the impact of
the two fines on both consumer surplus and total welfare in a relatively simple way.
4.1 Consumer surplus
The top priority of antitrust authorities in many countries is to protect consumers
interests.16 Hence, it is worth evaluating the impact on consumer surplus of the two
instruments that we consider. As the demand function is linear, and given that we
consider a symmetric duopoly, consumer surplus can be written as:
CS = Q2/2 ≡ 2q2. (14)
In the benchmark case, in which no penalty is implemented, collusion is sustain-
able for α > α∗ = 9/17. Following (13), the expected consumer surplus is:
ECS∗ = α∗
[
2(qN)2
]
+ (1− α∗) [2(qC)2] = 3 (A+ θ)2
17
. (15)
When the non-distorting profit based fine is adopted, the expected consumer
surplus amounts to:
ECSP = αP
[
2(qN)2
]
+ (1− αP )
[
2(qC)2
]
=
3(A+ θ)2 + 28ρF
17
, (16)
which is obviously higher than in the benchmark case. Relevant output levels qN and
qC are unaffected by the fine, which yet increases the interval region where collusion is
successfully deterred (αP > α
∗). This, in turn, reduces the probability that managers’
factors discount support the collusive behaviour.
Turning to the delegation based fine, the expected consumer surplus is:
ECSD = αD
[
2(qN)2
]
+ (1− αD)
[
2(qCD)
2
]
= (17)
=
3(A+ θ)3 + 15(A+ θ)2ρf − 13(A+ θ) (ρf)2 + 3 (ρf)3
17(A+ θ) + 3ρf
.
16The dispute on the appropriate standard for antitrust enforcement seems still unsettled: see, for
example, Pittman (2007) for more details.
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This is the first case where the aforementioned trade-off appears. When comparing
ECSD with ECS
∗, we have that qC
D
< qC , as already acknowledged in Remark 1.
However, collusion is less likely to occur, as αD > α
∗. Relatively simple algebraic
calculations reveal that the latter effect dominates the former one, and therefore
ECSD > ECS
∗.17
It follows that both a profit based fine and a delegation based fine enhance the
expected consumer surplus in comparison to the benchmark case, where no policy
instrument was adopted. The introduction of either type of fine brings forth a deter-
rence effect that not only makes collusion more difficult to be sustained, but it also
benefits consumers.
Under revenue equivalence, it is also possible to evaluate which one is better from
a consumer’s standpoint. We find that:
Proposition 3 Under (10) and assuming ρf < t, we find that ECSD > ECS
re
P
: a
delegation based fine is always preferred by consumers in comparison to a profit
based fine.
Proof see the Appendix.
The delegation based fine is not only more effective in deterring collusion, but it
is also preferred by consumers. This holds despite of its distortive effect on collusive
quantities. The following decomposition helps to explain why this occurs:
ECSD −ECSreP = (αD − αreP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
[
2(qN)2 − 2(qC)2]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Deterrence effect
− (1− αD)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
[
2(qC)2 − 2(qCD)2
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected distortionary effect
.
(18)
The difference in the expected consumer surplus under the two policy regimes can
be represented by two components induced by the delegation based fine in comparison
to the profit based one: a "deterrence effect" and an "expected distortionary effect".
The former captures the positive effect on consumer surplus that comes from the
reduction in the interval region that sustains collusion, and the corresponding increase
in the output level produced. The latter represents the reduction in consumers surplus
that derives from the lower output level which we obtain in presence of a delegation
based fine when collusion persists.
17More precisely, ECSD − ECS
∗ =
ρf[246(A+θ)2−221ρf(A+θ)+51(ρf)2]
289(A+θ)+51ρf
> 0 under the parametric
restrictions imposed on ρf , A, and θ.
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The result in Proposition 3 implies that the "deterrence effect" always dominates
the "expected distortionary effect". Following the basic assumptions of our paper,
a delegation based fine increases the interval region where managers compete non-
cooperatively. In addition, although such a fine induces a loss in consumer surplus
when collusion occurs, it also reduces the probability that this will happen, as a cartel
is less likely to be formed.
Finally, comparative statics reveal that ∂(ECSD − ECSreP )/∂θ > 0: when θ
increases, the delegation based fine is even more beneficial to consumers. As the
power delegated to the managers are extended, the benefits of deterring the cartel
further increase. The enhanced deterrence effect, by increasing the probability to
obtain an even richer Cournot-Nash outcome, dominates even more the distortion
generated by the delegation based instrument.
4.2 Aggregate surplus
Assume that the antitrust authority does not limit its attention only to consumer’s
protection, but it considers instead total social welfare. Following Vickers (1985), the
managers’ compensations linearly depends on m. They do not affect total welfare, as
they constitute a transfer between the firms and the managers. A similar observation
applies to the revenue collected by the antitrust authority, which corresponds to the
expected amount paid by collusive managers. Total welfare can therefore be written
as:18
TW = 2π + 2q2. (19)
where π represents firms’ profits as computed in Section 2.
Following the same reasoning as in (13), the expected welfare in the benchmark
case amounts to:
ETW ∗ = α∗
[
2πN + 2(qN)2
]
+ (1− α∗)
[
2πC + 2(qC)2
]
=
(7A− 3θ) (A+ θ)
17
. (20)
18The complete expression for total welfare is: TW =
∑2
i=1 (OSi)+
∑2
i=1 (MSi)+CS+AA, where
OS is the owner surplus, MS the manager surplus, CS the consumer surplus, and AA the revenue
cashed by the antitrust authority. Following the previous discussion, it is immediate to prove that
this boils down to TW = 2π+2q2. Notice that the latter expression applies to all regimes, including
both a profit and delegation based fine, assuming that the firms’ profits in presence of a cartel is
gross of both the expected fine and the managers’ payment, i.e. πi = (p− c)qi.
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In the presence of a profit based fine, we find:
ETWP = αP
[
2πN + 2(qN )2
]
+ (1− αP )
[
2πC + 2(qC)2
]
=
=
(7A− 3θ) (A+ θ)
17
+
4(5A− 7θ)ρF
17(A+ θ)
. (21)
Notice thatETWP ≥ ETW ∗ when (5) holds. The profit based fine raises the expected
welfare. The result is very intuitive: the redistributive effect that takes place when
using a lump-sum transfer does not change total welfare in the two scenarios. It does
increase, however, the probability to achieve the welfare enhancing Cournot-Nash
outcome, as the fine shifts the threshold discount factor from α∗ to αP .
Turning to the delegation based fine, the expected welfare is:
ETWD = αD
[
2πN + 2(qN)2
]
+ (1− αD)
[
2πCD + 2(q
C
D)
2
]
= (22)
=
(7A− 3θ)(A+ θ)2 + (11A− 15θ)(A+ θ)ρf + (A+ 13θ) (ρf)2 − 3 (ρf)3
17(A+ θ) + 3ρf
.
The differences with the previous case are evident: not only does the threshold dis-
count factor increase from α∗ to αD, but also the collusive welfare component W
C is
now affected by the output distortion implied by the delegation based fine.
The change in the threshold discount factor improves expected welfare, while
the quantity distortion moves in the opposite direction. Algebraic calculations reveal
that, under the conditions imposed in our model, the first effect always dominates the
second one. The delegation based fine is therefore welfare enhancing in comparison
to the benchmark case.
We can now proceed to compare the effects of the two types of fines under the
assumption of revenue equivalence. The following result holds:
Proposition 4 Under (10) and assuming ρf < t, the delegation based fine increases
total welfare more than a profit based fine if and only if ρf > t˜, with t˜ increasing
in θ. Conversely, if 0 < ρf < t˜, then a profit based fine is preferable.
Proof see Appendix.
Differently from the expected consumer surplus, here there is no policy instrument
that always prevails for the antitrust authority. The relative benefit of a delegation
based fine in comparison to a profit based fine can be written as:
16
ETWD −ETW reP = (αD − αreP )
(2πN − 2πC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
[
2(qN)2 − 2(qC)2
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Deterrence effect
− (1− αD)

(
2πC − 2πCD
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+
[
2(qC)2 − 2(qCD)2
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 .︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected distortionary effect
(23)
By comparing (18) and (23) it is possible to understand the reason why the profit
based fine can be preferred in terms of total welfare. The "deterrence effect", which
remains positive, is unambiguously reduced by the component 2πN − 2πC , which
indicates the loss in the profit surplus when the cartel is successfully deterred. The
"expected distortionary effect", on the contrary, does not provide a clear indication
on how it changes. It remains negative, but given that 2πC − 2πC
D
 0, its absolute
value can either increase or decrease. Algebraic calculations, however, confirm that∣∣2πN − 2πC∣∣ > ∣∣2πC − 2πC
D
∣∣. The reduction in the weight of the "deterrence effect"
dominates the change in the "expected distortionary effect".
The result of Proposition 4 are summarized in Figure 1.19 The interval region in
which t˜ < ρf < t represents all the combinations of expected fine ρf and delegation
parameter θ for which the "deterrence effect" is still stronger than the "expected
distortionary effect". The explanation is relatively simple. When the expected fine
ρf is sufficiently high, the deterrence effect of a delegation based fine increases. This,
in turn, reduces the relative weight of the "expected distortionary effect". Although
ex post distortionary effects may increase, it is ex ante less likely that a cartel takes
place. The delegation based fine is therefore preferred in terms of total welfare.
On the contrary, when 0 < ρf < t˜, the opposite holds. For low values of the
expected fine, indeed, the distortionary effect is likely to increase, as both quantities
and profits are negatively affected by the delegation based fine. This stronger dis-
tortionary effect may more than compensate a weakened deterrence effect, thereby
increasing the chances that the profit based fine be preferable in terms of expected
total welfare.
19Remember that the intial condition that we imposed was A ≥ 2θ, which verifies that equilibrium
profits are non-negative in the basic model. Picture 1 has been depicted for A = 5.
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Figure 1 Welfare effects
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Lastly, notice that the area where ETWD > ETW
re
P
is decreasing in θ. This
appears counterintuitive, especially when compared with the consumer surplus case,
where the "gain" brought by the delegation based fine was enhanced by θ. How-
ever, introducing profit surplus may alter the outcome. In fact, deterring a cartel
implies a decrease in profits, and such a negative effect is amplified when more pow-
ers are delegated to managers. Using (23), one can find that ∂
∣∣2πN − 2πC∣∣ /∂θ >
∂
∣∣2πC − 2πC
D
∣∣ /∂θ: a higher θ reduces more the "deterrence effect" than the "ex-
pected distortionary effect". More in general, the negative effect of θ on profit surplus
dominates its positive effect on consumer surplus, thus explaining the result.
5 Concluding Remarks
The fight against collusive behaviour in the US and in the EU is based on similar
principles. However, substantial differences still exist, especially regarding the instru-
ments adopted to carry out cartel deterrence. In particular, the criminal punishment
of managers is perceived as a crucial deterrent in the US but not in the EU.
This paper addresses the effectiveness of different types of instruments in deterring
cartels. In particular, we focus on fines levied on profits and fines targeting the powers
delegated to managers. The aim is to model in a stylised way the "punish-the-firm"
versus "punish-the-person" controversy and analyse its economic consequences. As
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the majority of firms involved in cartel cases are managerial firms, we analyse these
two types of antitrust instruments in the context of the delegation model of Vickers
(1985) and Fershtman and Judd (1987).
Our results indicate that the effectiveness of each type of instrument is closely
related to the amount of powers delegated to the managers. Intuitively, a delegation
based fine is more likely to effectively deter collusion when the decisional power dele-
gated to managers is sufficiently high. If the comparison is performed under revenue
equivalence, then the delegation based fine is more effective because its distortionary
effect further reduces the incentives to collude in comparison to the profit based fine.
Such a distortion, however, may have a negative consequences on the overall sur-
plus if managers are patient enough to sustain collusion, despite the antitrust efforts.
In this case, we identify an important trade-off that has largely been overlooked in the
existing literature between ex-ante effective deterrence and ex post output reduction
if collusion takes place.
The trade-off does not arise if the antitrust authority focuses on consumer surplus
as a measure of social welfare. In such a case, the delegation based fine is not only
more effective in deterring cartels, but it also further expands expected welfare than
the profit based fine. The same conclusion, however, does not apply if we consider
total surplus. The delegation based fine erodes cartel profits more than the profit
based fine, reducing the profit surplus. The interplay between the amount of the
fine and the delegation parameter provides further insights on the relative weight of
consumer surplus vis à vis profit effects and helps determining the overall desirability
of each type of fine.
Although our results are obtained in a very stylised model, we believe that the
main message of the paper can have relevant policy implications. Distortive fines
maybe very tempting for antitrust authorities. They allow for more effective cartel
deterrence, thereby benefiting consumers. However, if productive efficiency is also
relevant, then less distortive instruments can achieve higher overall welfare by limiting
the loss in profit surplus. This holds in particular for relatively low levels of the
expected punishment.
Ultimately, according to the results of our welfare analysis, the choice of the best
policy option may drive antitrust authorities back to the long and fierce debate about
the correct welfare standard to be adopted in competition policy: consumer surplus
or total welfare?
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Our work can be extended in different directions. We assumed that owners dele-
gated a fixed amount θ to the managers. This can be relaxed to fully characterize the
strategic interaction between owners and managers (see Lambertini and Trombetta,
2002). In such a context, the effectiveness of each instrument would be affected by
the decisions of the owners. It can be conjectured that the most effective instrument
would therefore depend on the strategic decisions of the owners at the initial stage
and there could be cases in which owners can exploit managers’ patience in order
to bypass the efforts of the antitrust authority. Finally, leniency programs can be
incorporated in our framework to study how they would interact with different types
of fines and how this may affect our current results.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
Assume that conditions (5) and (8) hold. We compare the two threshold discount
factors to obtain:
∆α = αP − αD =
288
17
{
ρF
(A+ θ)2
− 2 ρf (5(A+ θ)− 2ρf)
[(A+ θ) + 3ρf ] [17(A+ θ) + 3ρf ]
}
Algebraic calculations reveal that:
∆α > 0⇐⇒ ρF > T˜ = 2ρf (A+ θ)
2 (5 (A+ θ)− 2ρf)
(A+ θ + 3ρf) (17 (A+ θ) + 3 ρf)
,
where we maintain that ρf < t. Moreover, T˜ < T , as it can be easily ascertained.
Under condition (8), it is immediate to verify that T˜ is increasing in both the expected
fine ρf and the delegation parameter θ:
∂T˜
∂ρf
=
34 (A+ θ)3 (A+ θ + ρf) [5 (A+ θ)− 9ρf ]
(A+ θ + 3ρf)2 [17 (A+ θ) + 3ρf ]2
> 0,
∂T˜
∂θ
=
2 (A+ θ)ρf
[
85(A+ θ)3 + 540(A+ θ)2ρf + 27(A+ θ) (ρf )2 − 36 (ρf )3
]
(A+ θ + 3ρf)2 [17 (A+ θ) + 3ρf ]2
> 0.
This completes the proof. 
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Proof of proposition 2
Remember that the comparison between (??) and (9) takes place under the re-
striction t < t =
[
(A+ θ)
(
3− 2
√
2
)]
/3. We obtain:
∆αre = αreP − αD = −
432ρf
17
3 (ρf)3 + 15(A+ θ) (ρf)2 − 15(A+ θ)2ρf + (A+ θ)3
(A+ θ)2 (A+ θ + 3ρf) (17A+ 17θ + 3ρf)
.
Under the restriction imposed, the sign depends only on the term:
3 (ρf)3 + 15(A+ θ) (ρf)2 − 15(A+ θ)2ρf + (A+ θ)3  0.
This term has three real and positive zeros that can not be identified but through
trigonometric methods (casus irreducibilis). The relevant one is: ρ˜f = 0.79065(A+
θ) > t implying that αre
P
− αD < 0 for all values 0 < ρf < t.
Proof of proposition 3
Consider revenue equivalence as expressed in (10). The expected producer surplus
resulting from the profit based fine re-writes as follows:
ECSreP ≡
3(A+ θ)2 + 28ρf · (A+ θ)− 28 (ρf)2
17
. (24)
Assume that condition (11) holds. It is tedious but relatively simple to verify that
ECSD −ECSreP =
ρf
[
8(A+ θ)2 − 25(A+ θ)ρf + 93 (ρf)2
]
289(A+ θ) + 51ρf
> 0.
This completes the proof. 
Proof of proposition 4
The comparison is performed for 0 < ρf < t. The welfare differential can be
written as:
ETWD−ETW reP =
fρ
(−3f2ρ2(7A+ 31θ) + fρ(157A+ 25θ)(A+ θ)− 4(A+ 2θ)(A+ θ)2)
17(A+ θ)(17(A+ θ) + 3fρ)
.
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The sign of this expression depends on the numerator. The expression as a function
of ρf has one zero that is relevant in our domain, ρf = t˜ (θ) with
t˜(θ) =
(A+ θ)
(
157A+ 25θ −
√
24313A2 + 5690Aθ − 2351θ2
)
6(7A+ 31θ)
.
The sign of ∂t˜(θ)/∂θ is the same than the sign of the following expression:
563597A3+44907A2 θ−55281Aθ2+72881 θ3+
√
24313A2 + 5690Aθ − 2351 θ2
(
−3593A2 + 350Aθ + 775 θ2
)
,
which can be shown to be positive under the assumption of our paper. It follows
that t˜ (θ) is increasing with θ. 
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